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ABSTRACT 
 
The key question this thesis investigates is whether Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
are relevant and effective in delivering office accommodation projects in South 
Africa. 
 
While the procurement of large infrastructure projects in South Africa. is currently 
dominated by PPPs, it is, however, a relatively new form of procurement and presents 
a steep learning curve for those participating in such projects as they evolve. 
 
As South African PPPs are modelled on UK experiences of such partnerships, the 
greatest challenge we face is to adapt the model so that it recognizes and incorporates 
the unique South African context within which we work. Furthermore, while PPPs 
have been applied to a number of building-related infrastructure projects, they have 
only recently been applied to office accommodation ones. We thus need to explore 
and apply the relevant aspect of the PPP model for this particular type of 
accommodation. 
 
The South African National Treasury’s list of PPP projects planned for the coming 
years shows there is a high demand from national and local government departments 
for office accommodation, as well as a significant backlog for such facilities. This is 
placing considerable pressure not only on the delivery of such facilities, but also on 
the ability of government to finance the projects with funds required for other core 
government obligations. Government has thus had to adopt an alternative means of 
addressing these issues and is now engaging the private sector to provide the facilities, 
the financing and the services related to such accommodation.  
 
Using a detailed survey and a study of the relevant literature, this report highlights the 
key aspects to be taken into consideration in determining the relevance of PPPs in the 
effective delivery of office accommodation and makes useful recommendations based 
on the outcomes of the study.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
The South African government has recently shown an interest in using Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) to deliver some of its public services and infrastructures. The PPP 
procurement method is relatively new in South Africa and the complexity related to it 
poses a number of challenges to both the private and public sector. 
 
The main objectives of a PPP, according to the UK Government, are:  
a) To deliver improved public services by contributing to increases in the 
quality and quantity of investment; 
b) To release the full potential of public sector assets, including state-owned 
business, and hence provide value for the taxpayer and wider benefits for 
the economy; 
c) To allow stakeholders to receive a fair share of the benefits of PPPs (this 
includes customers and users of the service, taxpayers and employees). 
 
The South African PPP Agreements  include other objectives such as:  
d) To deliver black economic benefits; and  
e) To uplift the communities in the project environment. 
 
This study seeks to determine whether PPPs are effective in delivering public office 
accommodation projects and evaluates arguments for and against them as a means of 
service delivery. There are primarily two main schools of thought on the use of PPP 
for the delivery of public services. The proponents of PPPs argue that the benefits of 
PPPs include:  
 
• Promoting private investment in the capital assets required to deliver 
public services efficiently by bringing in private sector finance and 
operational management on a risk–taking basis; 
• Improving value for money by allocating risks to those best able to 
manage them in the public and private sectors; 
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• Encouraging the upgrading and rationalisation of government property, 
including that needed for service delivery; 
• Allowing the transfer of trading assets to the private sector, which 
would benefit from better utilisation, and of surplus operational land 
and buildings; 
• Facilitating joint ventures, giving authorities new scope to participate 
in companies led by the private sector and to secure the council’s 
contribution to only such joint ventures as public expenditure, not the 
activities of the company as a whole; and 
• Removing unnecessary obstacles to partnerships in areas of economic 
development and regeneration. 
(The Department of Environmental Transport Region’s (DETR), Local Government 
and Private Finance Initiative, 1998.) 
 
The industry views these benefits with some scepticism, particularly in delivering 
public office accommodation projects in South Africa. 
 
PPP critics argue that government can provide cheaper services than the private 
sector. Their criticism includes the following:   
 
• Governments enter into PPPs primarily to avoid debt;  
• the cost of service will increase to pay for the private partner's profit;  
• PPPs are more costly because of the effective risk transfer to the private 
sector; 
• PPPs result in poorer service quality and inefficient service delivery; 
• PPPs make it difficult to benefit from competition due a limited number of 
potential private partners with the expertise or ability to participate in PPPs;  
• the procurement process is long and complex resulting in high opportunity 
costs for private sector participants; 
• the use of output specification may not work as these are very subjective and 
require a lot interpretation given the complexity of a construction project; 
• government staff will lose under PPPs; 
• government losses control and accountability to the public; 
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• Given the uncertainty of the markets, long-term contracts (20 years) may not 
always be optimal.  
 
The above arguments in determining the effectiveness of PPP as a means of public 
service delivery are dealt with in the literature review. These arguments are brought 
into context and made relevant as far as the South African PPP environment is 
concerned through a survey conducted on public and private sector PPP participants 
as well as a case study review. 
 
The study is premised on the argument that costs are not the only consideration in 
evaluating the effectiveness of PPPs in the successful delivery of office 
accommodation. The study investigates other factors and their significance though a 
survey of public and private sector opinions of the significance of the key value 
drivers on the delivery of office accommodation projects through PPPs in South 
Africa. This was done in the form of a survey and the sample was drawn from PPP 
participants in South Africa. The results of these reflect the arguments advanced by 
the proponents and critics of PPPs for the delivery of services.  
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CHAPTER 1       
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a background to Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and 
explores why government and the private sector engages in them. It defines the key 
elements of the research topic, determines the research problem and provides the 
scope of the research, its limitation and the key findings. 
 
PPPs are based on the principles of government (the public sector) providing public 
infrastructure and services in the most economically efficient manner, by partnering 
with the private sector. This is intended to free government of the burden of managing 
the risk associated with the provision of services that could be better managed by 
private sector. It is assumed that the private sector is well positioned in terms of its 
experience and capacity to offer the best value for money, and that it will ensure quick 
access to technology and transfer of skills as well as capital to government without 
using state capital.  
 
Some of the motivations for using PPPs in office accommodation projects are that 
PPPs provide government with an opportunity to save costs in constructing capital 
projects and in operating and maintaining services. These can be realised, for 
example, by combining design and construction in the same contract. The close 
interaction of designers and constructors in a team can result in more innovative and 
less costly designs. The design and construction activity can be carried out more 
efficiently, thereby decreasing the construction time and allowing the facility to be put 
to use more quickly. Overall, professional services costs for inspections and contract 
management activities can be reduced, and the risks of project overruns can be 
reduced by design-build contracts. 
 
Furthermore, government can save costs in the operation and maintenance of facilities 
and service systems. Private partners must be able to reduce the cost of operating or 
maintaining facilities by applying economies of scale, innovative technologies, using 
more flexible procurement and compensation arrangements or by reducing their 
overheads.  
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PPPs also allow more innovative revenue sources to be introduced that would not be 
possible under conventional methods of service delivery. PPPs promote private 
investment in the capital assets required to deliver public services efficiently by 
bringing in private sector finance and operational management on a risk –taking basis. 
 
PPPs are also used to address the social service delivery backlog. A PPP can have a 
significant impact on job creation during the construction and operation of the facility, 
in the development of small business enterprises, through skills development, 
community up-liftment as well as through direct and indirect economic empowerment 
of previously disadvantaged individuals and entities. This is achieved through equity 
participation in the project and opportunities emanating from the project including 
procurement and provision of services during the construction and the operation of the 
facilities. For these reasons, among others, the South African government has pursued 
the option of PPPs for the procurement of some of the capital-intensive public 
services. 
 
Research carried out by the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) encourages the 
use of PPPs but proposes that clear criteria be established for assessing whether or not 
PPPs are the right approach. These, it argues, should be social equity, value for money 
and accountability. 
 
The Fitzgerald (2004) review identifies the range of potential benefits of PPP projects 
as: 
a) improved service outcomes 
b) better value for money 
c) appropriate risk transfer 
d) innovation 
e) greater asset utilization 
f) integrated whole-of-life asset management  
(Fitzgerald 2004, p.17) 
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1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Research question: Are PPPs effective in delivering public sector office 
accommodation in South Africa?  
 
1) Primary Hypothesis 
PPPs are an effective mechanism for the delivery of office accommodation 
projects in South Africa.  
 
As much as PPPs are seen as an alternative procurement method because of the 
benefits they provide, their effectiveness in achieving value for money in office 
accommodation projects has come under criticism. To determine whether they are 
indeed effective for office accommodation projects in South Africa, the study 
compares the benefits of PPPs against the challenges they present. The context of 
PPPs in the South African environment is also taken into account. This includes: 
capacity of both private and public sector to deliver PPPs; the availability of skills; the 
macro- and micro-economic factors; the political environment; empowerment issues; 
the ability of the private sector to underwrite the risks on a long-term basis; and the 
existence of the private sector market for PPP. 
 
Some of the literature argues that government can provide goods and services at a 
lower cost than the private sector. In answering the research question, it is argued that 
cost should not be the only consideration in determining whether PPPs are capable of 
producing the desired effect i.e. value for money. The research identifies and 
investigates other key factors to achieve this and their significance in the delivery of 
office accommodation projects through PPP.  
 
The research also investigates the challenges related to achieving the desired effect 
(value for money) by analyzing the key drivers responsible for delivering value for 
money in PPPs in South Africa.  
 
A study carried out by Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE (1998) and 
commissioned by the UK Treasury Task Force was used to identify these key drivers. 
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The report evaluated a range of value drivers through a survey of public sector project 
managers by ranking their relative importance. Six of the 18 value drivers scored 10 
points or more, which was the minimum threshold for determining the most important 
drivers. The six key drivers for value for money were: 
 
• Risk transfer 
The ability to transfer risk to the party best able and suited to manage it to 
ensure optimum value for money 
• Long-term nature of the contract 
 The long-term contracts allows for certainty of revenues over a period of time 
and therefore proves a good incentive for the private sector to invest in a long- 
term high-quality delivery of service incorporating whole lifecycle costing 
which results in cost-saving benefits for the public sector 
• The use of output-based specification 
The public sector transfers a significant level of risk and responsibility to the 
private sector over the long-term arrangement. The contractual arrangements 
emphasise performance-based outcomes rather than relying solely on 
specifications. 
• Competition: PPPs provide better value for money because of their 
competitive procurement processes and their ability to benefit from whole 
lifecycle costing; 
• Performance measurement and incentives: Payments to the contractor 
under a PPP contract are characterised as a regular 'unitary' fee for services 
which must be subject to performance appraisal in relation to specific and 
quantified criteria in the contract –performance related reward; 
• Private sector management skills: PPPs provides an opportunity to advance 
the public sector through contributions from the private sector through the 
transfer of skills, technology innovation, focus on customer requirements, 
business and management skills. This study assumes that these six key value 
drivers are applicable in the South African context.  
 
Two additional key value drivers have been included in the investigation:  
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• Robust Financial Solution: PPPs provide a financial solution that is 
sustainable for the project, the client, the shareholders as well as the lenders to 
the project over the life of the project;   
• Partnership approach: The state alone cannot support the desirable level of 
public services. The delivery of these essential services can be done to the 
mutual advantage of both the public and private sector. 
 
The literature review investigates some of the criticism levelled at the application of 
PPPs in procuring public services. Furthermore, the survey evaluates some of the 
challenges associated with implementing the PPP key value drivers in office 
accommodation projects.  
 
To test the relevance and applicability of the key value drivers identified in the 
literature review in the South African context, a survey was undertaken amongst 
people in the public and private sector who had experience in the PPP procurement 
process.  
 
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The study evaluates the effect of key value for money drivers on the delivery of office 
accommodation projects and the challenges in achieving value for money. It also 
seeks to investigate the significance of the key value drivers on office accommodation 
projects.  
 
The study comprises the following main areas: 
 
a) Literature review of the key value drivers in PPPs and a discussion of some of 
the arguments both for and against aspects of PPPs; 
b) A survey of the public and private sectors' opinion on the impact of the PPP 
key value drivers on office accommodation projects; 
c) The findings of the study; and  
d) Recommendations on using PPPs for office accommodation projects.  
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1.4 LIMITATIONS  
 
The study is focused on the requirements for achieving the effective delivery of office 
accommodation projects through PPPs rather than on evaluating whether PPP office 
accommodation projects conceived to date in South Africa have indeed achieved the 
key principle of PPPs, being value for money. This latter question presents an 
opportunity for future research once sufficient information is available for meaningful 
results. The current study also investigates the significance of the key value 
determinants.  
 
The research does not compare PPPs to other procurement methods available to 
government, but rather evaluates the effectiveness of PPPs for delivering office 
accommodation projects against a set of requirements (PPP key value drivers). 
 
There is very limited reliable information and experience on procuring office 
accommodation through PPPs in South Africa. The only project completed to date 
was undertaken by the Department of Trade and Industry in Pretoria, South Africa.  
 
The relatively short history of PPPs makes it difficult to evaluate adequately their 
financial outcomes. This will only be measurable in the longer term. A further 
limitation is the lack of access to information on concession agreements, viability and 
performance of projects as this is usually regarded as confidential commercial 
information.  
 
1.5 METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
A review of the literature was undertaken as well as a survey of both public and 
private sector’s opinion on the impact of the PPP key value drivers on office 
accommodation projects and their challenges. The survey was aimed at maintaining a 
focus and relevance on PPPs within the South African context. A questionnaire was 
developed on the factors that impact the effectiveness of PPP in delivering office 
accommodation projects. These included the key value drivers identified in the 
literature and the related challenges in implementing them. The survey respondents 
comprised representatives of public and private sector who were involved in recent 
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PPPs for office accommodation projects (Department of Education and Department of 
Trade and Industry).  
 
The responses were grouped according to the respondents' sectors (public and private) 
whilst participating in the PPP project. A lirket scale was used to determine the level 
of agreement to the variables of key drivers of value and the challenges in 
implementing these in office accommodation PPPs.  
 
The data was analysed using descriptive statistical measures, primarily determining 
the mean scores and the coefficient of variation in the responses, which tests the 
reliability of the mean by measuring the level of dispersion, or level of consensus, for 
each statement. The reliability of the central measure is represented by a low measure 
of coefficient of variation.  In addition, the correlation was used to determine the 
strength of the relationship between the variables in the responses by the private and 
public sectors. A high correlation indicates a strong relationship between the variables 
and a low correlation implies a non-linear one.  
 
1.6 DEFINITION  
 
1.6.1 Public Private Partnership (PPPs)  
 
National treasury Regulation 16 of the PFMA defines Public Private Partnership or 
PPP as a commercial transaction between an institution and a private party in terms of 
which the private party 
a) performs an institutional function on behalf of the institution;and or 
b)  acquires the use of the state property for its own commercial purposes and 
d) assumes the substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection 
with the performance of the institutional function and or use of state property; 
and 
e) receives benefit for performing the institutional function or from utilizing the 
state property either by way of 
• consideration to be paid by the institution which derives from the 
revenues of such institution; or 
• charges or fees to be allocated by the private party from users or 
customers of a service provided to them; or 
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• a combination of such consideration and such charges or fees. 
 
From the government perspective, a PPP is a contractual agreement whereby a private 
party performs a departmental service delivery or administration function and 
assumes the associated risks. In return, the private party receives a fee according to 
predefined performance criteria.  
Strategic Framework for PPP Projects,2002, National Treasury SA, PPP Manual 
 
From private sponsors' perspective, a PPP is essentially an act of project financing. It 
is characterised by the formation of a highly geared 'Special Purpose Company' as a 
project vehicle. This has the consequence of reliance on direct revenues to pay for 
operating costs and cover debt financing while giving the desired return on risk 
capital.  
 
Ideally, PPPs should be contractual arrangements that allow the resources, risks and 
rewards of both the public agency and the private company to be combined. In this 
way, they provide greater efficiency, better access to capital and improved 
compliance with government regulations, all in providing an efficient workplace 
environment. The public's interests are fully assured through provisions in the 
contracts that provide for on-going monitoring and oversight of the operation of a 
service or development of a facility. In this way, the benefit of the government entity, 
the private company and the public is assured (Greenwood, 2000). 
 
In all the above definitions, the PPP arrangement is focused on shifting service 
delivery and the associated risks from the public to the private sector. 
 
1.6.2 Difference between PPI and PPP 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), the closest British equivalent to the South African 
PPPs, differ from PPPs in that PPPs have a wider scope. These include:   
• Private ownership of state-owned businesses (full or partial privatisation of 
government-owned enterprise); 
• Long–term service procurement arrangements, including those where the 
private sector provides the infrastructure (PFI); and  
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• Partnership arrangements to sell public services into wider markets and exploit 
the commercial potential of assets. 
 
1.6.3 Adjective: Effective 
Being 'effective' is defined as having an intended effect/result or being capable of 
producing a desired effect.  
 
1.6.4 Office Accommodation 
'Office accommodation' refers to premises used by government departments for the 
primary purpose of accommodating its staff to deliver public services.  
 
1.6.5 Value for Money 
'Value for money' is defined as an effective use of public funds on capital projects 
which come from private sector innovation and skills in design, construction 
techniques and operational practices, as well as from transferring key risks associated 
with PPP projects (Ghere, RK, 2001). 
 
1.7 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
1.7.1 Literature Review 
PPPs clearly give rise to challenges for participants of both the private and public 
sector. The study identifies a number of these challenges and proposes how they can 
be managed. 
 
1.7.2 The Survey on Key Value Drivers 
The questionnaire comprised four main sections, namely: 
A) Biographical information of the respondents; 
B) Evaluation of the impact of PPP key value drivers on office accommodation 
projects; and  
C) Challenges relating to the implementation of the key value drivers.  
 
The following is a summary of the key findings. The full results are detailed in the 
Chapter 4 of this report. 
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Section A – Biographical Information 
 
The survey was conducted on 49 respondents, 65 percent of which were from the 
private sector.  All the respondents had a reasonably high level of understanding of 
the PPP process, they had all previously participated in a PPP  office accommodation 
project and  44 percent had participated in the 'Request for Proposal' stage of a bid 
process. Most the private sector respondents indicated that the minimum project 
capital amount that warranted their participation was R201-R300 million, as this 
allows for better economies to be achieved from a risk reward and funding 
perspective. 
 
Section B – Key value drivers 
 
All the PPP key value drivers identified and investigated in the survey appear to have 
a significant impact on the delivery of office accommodation projects through PPPs. 
The results suggest that the factors responsible for achieving value for money in PPPs 
are applicable and relevant for office accommodation PPPs. Both the private and 
public sector considered the risk transfer, output-specification and robust financial 
solution as having the most impact on office accommodation PPPs. 
 
Section C – Challenges of implementing the key value drivers 
 
a) Output Specification 
The survey showed that the mismatch between various factors posed enormous 
challenges in achieving the effective delivery of office accommodation through PPPs. 
These were the specified level of performance and the affordability level (concession 
fee), risk of over-specifying the output with the potential of limiting the flexibility of 
the private sector to offer innovative design solutions.   
 
b) Procurement Process 
The greatest criticism of the PPPs procurement process was the lengthy contract-
award period and the high cost of bids. Some of the recommended solutions include 
standardising the concession contract, pre-allocating risks, proper due diligence to all 
the risk aspects and performance indicators.  
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c) Risk Transfer  
Risk transfer is a critical aspect of value for money in PPPs. The challenge is not only 
to transfer the appropriate risks to the party best able to manage the risks, but also to 
optimally allocate the risks in a fair manner that motivates the private sector to 
perform and ensures that the benefits exceed the extra costs associated with risk 
transfer.  
 
d) Robust Financial model resulting in cost savings  
The critics of PPP argue that government can provide cheaper services than the 
private sector. The survey results indicate that cost is not the main driver on the 
effectiveness of PPP in delivering office accommodation projects, but that other 
factors have a significant bearing on it. 
 
However, PPP funding does present challenges. Over-reliance on cash flows linked to 
a performance criteria pose risks to financiers. These have to be taken into account in 
the overall cost structure of PPP projects. Secondly, the returns for the shareholders 
have to be commensurate with the risks taken, which also contributes to the cost of a 
PPP project. Thirdly, the premium attached to empowerment funding into the costs 
and the additional guarantees required from the shareholders to cover any risks must 
also be factored in. Comparing PPP funding to the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
must take into account the peculiarities surrounding the risk transfer benefit to the 
government. 
To achieve effective delivery of office accommodation projects, all the key value 
drivers must be in place and their challenges must be addressed. 
 
1.8 THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
 
Chapter 1 
This section provides an introduction and background to the research, defines the 
research problem and provides a summary of the findings.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
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This section provides a review of the literature pertinent to the research problem and 
the research objectives. Its aim is to inform the development of the study's key 
objectives and recommendations. 
 
Chapter 3  
This section describes the methodology used to address both the problem and 
objectives of the research. The key elements are:  the definition of the population to 
be studied; the procedure used to sample the population; the construction and validity 
of the questionnaire used to gather the data required for addressing the research 
problem; and the objectives and tools employed in analysing the data. 
 
Chapter 4  
This section presents the analysis of the data and an interpretation of the results. 
 
Chapter 5  
This section presents the conclusions, recommendations and area for further research. 
 
Bibliography and Appendices  
These sections contain the sources of the information used in the research, the 
questionnaire used for the survey and the data captured for the research survey. 
 
 1.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarises the report, and specifies the areas that are related and of 
interest to the research but that have been omitted, and provides recommended areas 
for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2       
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review was conducted to determine factors relevant to the objective of 
the research as stated in Chapter 1, and explores aspects that impact on the effective 
delivery of office accommodation through PPPs. It also explores the key principles at 
the heart of PPPs - the value for money drivers. This is achieved through an analysis 
of the key issues relating to value for money. These are: risk transfer; output 
specification; procurement process; financial requirements; long-term nature of the 
contract; partnership approach and the capacity of the private sector to deliver the 
required outputs. The literature review further looks at the challenges experienced in 
using PPPs to deliver office accommodation projects.  
 
2.1 Gaps in the literature 
While the PPP key value drivers were identified through the literature, their 
importance to, and relationship with, office accommodation procurement are not 
explained. This gap in the literature was addressed by surveying the views of PPP 
participants on the importance of the key value drivers for office accommodation and 
the challenges associated with implementing them.  
 
The published literature included written reports and academic research on the subject 
matter and related topics. Although a range of documents was accessed and time was 
spent in identifying and assessing the relevant documents, the list is not exhaustive. 
Furthermore, limited research has been carried out to date on whether PPP projects 
have delivered value for money as anticipated. 
 
2.2 Areas covered by literature review 
  
The literature covers areas relevant to value for money in PPPs as follows: 
 
• Principles of PPPs; 
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• The South African Framework for PPP: National Treasury Provisions 
• The South African environment for PPPs; 
• Evaluation of arguments for and against PPPs; 
• Arguments suggesting that government can provide goods and services 
cheaper than the private sector; 
• Evaluation of other value for money drivers and their significance in office 
accommodation projects; 
• Value for money drivers; 
• Critical review of PPPs and challenges of value for money drivers; 
• Where are PPPs most appropriate; 
• Discussion on the public sector comparator (PSC).  
 
2.3 Principles of PPP 
 
The principles of PPPs, as outlined in the review, identify some of the value for 
money drivers.  
The National Treasury Standardised Provisions for PPP agreements identified three 
key principles of PPP as achieving Substantial transfer of risk to the private party, 
Value for Money and Affordability of Services. 
 
Substantial Transfer of Risks to the Private party: means optimal allocation of risk 
associated with PPP agreements to the private party taking into account the cost of 
securities to mitigate such risks whilst ensuring vale for money is achieved. 
 
Value for Money means that the provision of the institutional function or use of state 
property by a private party in terms of the PPP agreement results in a net benefit to 
the institution defined in terms of cost, price; quality; quantity; risk transfer or a 
combination thereof. 
 
Affordability of Services means that the financial commitments to be incurred by an 
institution in terms of the PPP can be met by funds designated within the institution’s 
existing budget for institutional function to which agreement relates and/or destined 
for institution in accordance with the relevant treasury’s future budgetary projections 
for the institution 
  
 21
 
 
As the PPP concept is relatively new to South Africa, a great deal of reliance has been 
placed on the British PPP/PFI experience. The UK has implemented numerous PPP 
projects, with varying degrees of success, and guidelines and principles have been 
developed in the form of the UK Treasury Taskforce Model Contract and Guidance. 
These guidelines and principles have been incorporated into the current model for 
South African PPP projects. 
The South African Framework For PPP: National Treasury Provisions (March 2004) 
identifies three main principles for PPP as follows: 
• Risk transfer to the private party 
• Value for money and 
• Affordability of the services. 
 
The UK government has identified four inter-related principles at the heart of private 
finance initiatives (PFIs) (Hall, 1998): 
 
a) Risks between the public and private sector parties should be allocated to that party 
best able to manage them to ensure optimum value for money (genuine risk transfer); 
 
b) The two fundamental requirements for PFI schemes are that the public sector must 
secure value for money and the private sector must genuinely assume responsibility 
for the risks associated with the scheme (Haarmeyer and Moody, 1998). 
 
c) Contracts should specify the service output required by the public sector client 
from the private sector (output specification). In the PPP arrangement, the public 
sector transfers a significant level of risk and responsibility to the private sector over 
the long-term arrangement. The contractual arrangements emphasise performance-
based outcomes rather than relying solely on specifications (Falk and Larson, 2001). 
 
d) PFI contracts should normally require the contractor to take the responsibility and 
assume risk for the performance of the asset over the long-term, at least for a 
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significant part of its useful life, so that efficiencies arising from long–term asset 
management can be realised (whole-lifecycle asset performance),  
 
In essence, the PFI approach turns government into a user rather than an acquirer of 
equipment or facilities and the private sector into a service provider rather than a mere 
contractor. The consequence is a far –reaching exercise of risk-sharing among all 
parties involved - the government, the industrials and the financiers - with customised 
legal and financing structures on a project–by–project basis. This ensures that they 
assume all risk classes acceptable to the private parties.  The definition of 'acceptable 
risks' naturally varies with the nature of the project (Bradford, 2001).  
 
e) Payments to the contractor under a PFI contract are characterised by a regular 
'unitary' fee for services, which must be subject to performance appraisal in relation to 
specific and quantified criteria in the contract -performance related reward.  
 
The performance criteria must be well defined to avoid ambiguity. Any area that lacks 
clarity compels the private sector to regard it as an area of risk, which places a 
premium on it and thus affects the value for money.  
 
2.4 The South African Framework For PPP: National Treasury Provisions 
(March 2004) 
 
The National Treasury PPP Manual and Standardised PPP Provisions provides a 
regulatory framework in terms of which national and provincial institutions can enter 
into the public private partnership agreements. The Standardised provisions highlight 
the key issues pertinent to PPP projects as regulated by the provisions of regulation 16 
of the Treasury Regulations (“Treasury Regulation 16”). It focuses on the manner in 
which such issues must be addressed whilst achieving substantial risk transfer, value 
for money and affordability. Important issues specific to Office Accommodation from 
the Standardised PPP Provisions are discussed in the study.  
 
Condition of the site 
The National Treasury PPP provisions (March 2004) require for the Private party to 
conduct a thorough investigation on the proposed project site and assume all the risks 
  
 23
related to the site. The public sector may achieve better value for money if it 
commissions (at its costs) some of the surveys that form part of the bidders 
investigation at the feasibility study phase and well before the signing of PPP 
Agreement. The public party needs to ensure that the Private party has recourse to the 
independent expert if such surveys are inaccurate. This however should not release 
the private party out of its obligation to investigate and verify the accuracy of 
information pertaining to the site (such as land availability agreements, existing 
leases, land claims, the use rights and tax considerations). 
 
Planning consents 
Where the public party is responsible for the selection of the Project site it must be 
responsible for obtaining any zoning, rezoning and or land use consents for the 
Project site. This must be achieved prior to the Project being put on tender to avoid 
unnecessary delays. The costs of such consents should be included in the affordability 
assessment forming part of the application for Treasury Application 1(TA: 1). 
 
The private party must be responsible for identifying and obtaining all the planning 
and building consents required to enable the construction of the facilities on the 
Project site. 
 
Environmental consents 
The PPP provisions require for the private party to assume all environmental risks. 
The private party is often reluctant to assume all the environmental risks in particular 
if these cannot be quantified within acceptable levels of commercial risks. It is 
recommended that in cases where the Environmental Impact Assessment is a 
condition to obtaining the zoning, the public party should be responsible for obtaining 
the necessary approvals. The private party should assume any other environmental 
risks specific to its design and construction specifications. The private party should be 
indemnified for environmental contamination risks caused by activities conducted on 
the site or on the adjacent site before the date on which control of the site is 
transferred to the private party. For future contamination risks arising from ongoing 
activities, the private sector should rely on the remedies available to it under the 
common law against the polluter. 
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Heritage Resources 
The PPP provisions require for the private party to comply with all applicable 
legislation relating to heritage resource. It is recommended that for value for money 
consideration, the public party procures the in-principle consents on the basis of 
general design concepts for its spatial requirements for office accommodation and 
surveys prior to going out on tender. The costs thereof must be incorporated into the 
Feasibility studies for TA1 approval. Where the private party undertakes any 
additional works or variation as a result of discoveries of any heritage resource, then 
the private sector must be compensated for such. 
 
Utilities and Resources 
The public party should undertake the thorough investigation for supply of utilities to 
the boundary of the site prior to going out on Tender so as to clearly identify how the 
risks will be shared amongst the parties and clearly assess the impact on affordability 
and value for money. 
 
Warranties 
The public sector must seek to provide some warranties particularly in respect to 
aspects where access to information is in its control provided this will result in better 
value for money. According to the Standardised provisions “warranty” is defined as a 
statement confirming the truth of the matters in the Agreement. For the public party to 
gain the comfort and confidence to provide any warranties in respect to information 
issued, the public party must at its cost arrange for appointment of independent 
consultants with appropriate experience and expertise to undertake the relevant survey 
to investigate and verify such information beforehand (at feasibility stage). Care 
should be taken that duplication is avoided by providing warranties in respect of risks 
covered by project insurance as the costs thereof will be included in the Unitary 
Payment.  
 
Indemnities 
The Private party may be required to provide indemnities for risks in respect of its 
obligations to perform that cannot be covered by project insurances (such as damage 
to property, breach of statutory duty, death and personal injury, other third party 
claims and breach of private party warranty). The costs related to such will be 
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provided for in a form of contingent liability and included in the bid price. The public 
party should provide indemnity only in cases where conduct on its part would not be 
covered by project insurance or compensation mechanism provided for in the PPP 
Agreement. The consideration should be made to an extent that this will achieve 
better value for money. Care should be taken to ensure that the indemnity is limited to 
direct losses (excluding indirect or consequential losses) of the indemnified party. 
 
Design Risks 
The design risks must be assumed by the private party however the public party must 
satisfy itself that the design will meet the output specifications. The public sector 
without micro-managing the inputs into the design must be satisfied that the 
preliminary design is sufficiently flexible to allow for changes and improvements 
effected to meet the planning and /or the environmental requirements .The 
reassurance to both parties is provided by an Independent Certifier who will inspect 
the completed works and if satisfied issue the Completed Certificate. 
 
Acceptance and Service Commencement 
The provisions stipulate that before the private sector can issue the availability 
certificate declaring the service commencement date, the Independent Certifier  
(appointed by the private party and approved by public party) has to issue a 
completion certificate. Once the completion has been issued, the public party can 
accept service commencement pursuant to the terms of the PPP agreement. 
Notwithstanding that the Independent Certifier provides reasonable and objective 
measure of ensuring that the private party completes the works in accordance with the 
PPP Agreement, the completion risk remains with the Private party. 
 
Security Against Late Service Commencement 
The public party needs to evaluate the losses to be suffered by way of liquidated 
damages in an event of delay against the cost of insurances and any other mitigation 
measures by the private party for security against late service commencement. The 
liquidated damages should be quantified and effected only to an extent that they will 
result in value for money. If the public party will not suffer significant losses resulting 
from late service commencement, then the protection allowed by the security should 
be waived. Considerations must be given to the cost of all types of securities 
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including construction bonds which should be evaluated against the costs that will 
result from the failure of the private party to complete the works. In addition, the 
public sector needs to take a view on the standby equity and sponsor support in a form 
undertakings and obligations in favour of the lenders to achieve service 
commencement on time. The adequacy of such security to provide the necessary 
comfort must also impact on the value for money decisions.  
 
Availability of Services 
Availability is a critical factor in the PPP. The definition of availability must be 
specific to the conditions and dates that must be met if the services are to be 
considered available. The definition must be objective, reasonably measurable and as 
comprehensive as possible. The processes of measuring availability should be kept 
simple and cost effective. The Penalty deductions should come to effect only on the 
basis of unavailability of specified critical aspects and for sever performance related 
failures. The Private party should be given a reasonable period within which to rectify 
the problem without triggering the penalty deductions. 
 
The public party needs to evaluate the securities which costs are factored into the 
project by the private sector against the criticality of unavailability of services 
insured.  
 
Maintenance 
The private party should have the flexibility to amend its maintenance programme to 
meet the required output specifications with minimum interference from the public 
party. A planned preventative maintenance programme detailing replacement of plant, 
machinery, equipment, fixtures, fittings and/or furniture designed to maintain the 
facilities is a responsibility of the private party to manage. The public sector need not 
impose security for maintenance obligations as the comfort for this can be provided 
by other provisions of maintenance reserve account or other provisions such as the 
sinking fund. The maintenance reserve account should cater for residual value risk of 
the asset in an event that this has not been transferred to the private party. The public 
party should on a basis of value for money make a determination of the risk transfer 
so far as the residual value for the asset is concerned. 
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Performance Monitoring 
The performance monitoring levels should be set by the public party based on Good 
Industry Practice and taking into account affordability and value for money. 
Benchmarks for commercial office accommodation should be investigated and 
applied. The methodology for monitoring is substantially based on self-monitoring 
mechanism by the Private sector subject to periodic reviews by the Public party as 
well as the ability of users to report failures. The effectiveness of the monitoring 
systems depends on the accuracy of data collected and provided by the private party 
and ultimately impacts on the calculation of the penalty deductions. The performance 
measures should be as comprehensive and objective as practical but this might not be 
achieved in some aspects due to the complexity of serviced office accommodation. 
Surveys on end user satisfaction should be conducted for qualitative aspects of the 
performance. The penalty deduction system should reflect a clear link between the 
seriousness of failure, the value of the penalty deduction accrued and the potential 
financial impact on the private party.  
 
Payment Mechanism 
The payment mechanism comprises of a fixed single or Unitary Payment for available 
services over the lifetime of the project. It should not contain a fixed portion to which 
the private party is entitled irrespective of availability or its performance. The PPP 
recommends that the inflation risk above CPIX should be shared between the public 
and private sector and that other than inflationary increases, there should be no other 
increases of the Unitary Payment. 
 
The PPP discourages benchmarking at pre-determined intervals during the service 
period. Amendments to the output specification resulting in an increase in the unitary 
payment should be dealt with in terms of variation order or as Pass Through Costs 
paid by the private party and reimbursed by the public party. 
 
Insurance 
The public sector should assess whether the risks transferred to the private party are 
priced on commercially reasonable terms and where commercial cover is unavailable 
to cover such risks (i.e. escalation risks above inflation), whether the premium 
charged by the Private party will result in value for money. Due consideration should 
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be given for Project insurance including legal liability insurances, professional 
indemnity, business interruption insurance and non-vitiation protection (protection 
allowing public party to claim as a co-insured for information withheld by the private 
party) on a basis of value for money. For uninsurable risks that are justifiably not in 
the control of the private party, the public sector should consider the benefits of 
uninsurability relief against the substantial contingency provisions to cover such risks. 
The relief must only be limited to cover debt service and private party’s capital and 
operating expenditure. 
 
The public sector should resort to economic test only where the risk of total 
destruction of the project assets is high and reinstatement period is lengthy. Where 
economic test shows that the insurance proceeds are sufficient to reinstate the project 
assets and such reinstatement will not impact on debt service over the originally 
envisaged repayment period, then the proceeds must be so applied in accordance with 
pre-agreed reinstatement plan otherwise the proceeds should be applied towards 
repayment of debt with the private sector remaining under an obligation to reinstate 
the project assets. 
 
Relief Events, Compensation Events and Force Majeur 
Relief Events are events which prevent performance by the private party of its 
obligations at any stage during the project term that are best managed by the private 
party (although not necessarily in its control) and for which the private party bears 
financial risks. Typically this includes but not limited to fire, flood, accidental loss, 
damage to the works/facilities, shortage of power, discovery of heritage objects, delay 
in obtaining any consent. The relief events are expressed by being given time and not 
money. 
 
Compensation Events are designed to cater for delays which arise before the service 
commencement date as a result of the public party breach resulting in increased costs 
to the private party as well as delays occasioned by third parties under the control of 
the public party during the period of the project term resulting in reduced revenue. 
This approach provides the public sector with an incentive to manage its rights and 
obligations particularly during the construction phase. The compensation events are 
expressed by being given time and money. 
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Force Majeure definition should be limited to events which are out of the control of 
both parties and which if they continue for at least six months are likely to cause a 
material adverse consequence on either party and could result in termination of the 
PPP agreement. The consequences of an event such as Force Majeure should be 
shared between the parties and in absence of agreement, either party should be 
entitled to terminate the PPP agreement. Typically the events include war, terrorism, 
nuclear contamination, chemical or biological contamination. 
 
Change in Legislation 
The private party is expected to bear the risks for unforeseeable conduct by 
governments except where these risks are discriminatory on the basis of engaging in a 
PPP. It is considered that the risks would normally be the same as for any commercial 
transaction and the Private sector is expected to use all reasonable endeavors to 
mitigate any cost increases. The relief event should be effected in an event that the 
unforeseeable conduct has occurred. 
 
Variations 
Variations to the output specification cater for changes in the public party’s 
requirements which could not be anticipated or quantified at signature date or external 
factors for which the public party has retained responsibility (for example a change of 
policy). Variations proposed by the private party need to be assessed whether they are 
mandatory and how the costs (if any) will be allocated through a well-defined 
procedure. A balance must be struck between maintaining the flexibility to 
accommodate a change in the output specification and the cost for such provision. The 
variation during construction phase should be paid by the public party by means of a 
lump sum, staged payments or sums for reasonable costs incurred by the private party 
in implementing such variation. Any increase in operating costs resulting from the 
public party variation should be met by an increase in Unitary payment. 
 
Employment 
Where transfer of staff to private party is concerned, Section 197 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 providing for automatic transfer of the contractual obligations of 
employees should be considered. All the benefits that have accrued in the pre-transfer 
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period should be independently valued and the public party should indemnify the 
private party in respect of any claim by the transferring employee for such. 
 
Black Economic Empowerment 
The PPP must incorporate the government’s policy objectives for BEE contained in 
the Code of Good Practice in respect of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act, 2004 (the “BBBEE Act”) which include ownership of equity, management 
control, participation in the subcontracting arrangements and procurement 
requirements, skills development, socio-economic benefits for the local community, 
SMMEs, the Youth, the disabled and Non-profit Organisation. 
 
The monitoring of the implementation of the private party empowerment involves a 
substantial element of self-monitoring by the private sector with reviews by the public 
sector at scheduled intervals. The BEE commitments need to link into and be 
consistent with the overall payment mechanism. Noncompliance with BEE targets 
may attract penalties resulting in deductions against the Unitary Payment and if not 
remedied, cause termination of the PPP agreement. 
 
The agreements in respect of BEE arrangements must be reflected in cash flows of the 
project incorporated in the financial model. The black equity must be locked-in for a 
specified period allowing for the whole or part thereof to be transferred only to other 
black shareholders. 
 
Termination 
Termination may occur prior to expiry date due to public party or private party 
default, force majeure (and the parties are unable to agree on a mutually acceptable 
solution) or corrupt acts. A fair balance need to be achieved the public part desire to 
be able to terminate for inadequate service provision and the private party’s and its 
funders’ interests in restricting termination to the severest of defaults when all options 
have been exhausted. The PPP should provide a mechanism (for example pre-
termination notice) that allows the private party to remedy breaches that are capable 
of being remedied to avoid termination. 
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The termination of the PPP agreement should be without prejudice to any accrued and 
continuing rights and obligations of the public and the private party. The PPP 
agreement must provide a procedure to be followed prior to expiry date in order to 
determine the condition of the Project assets and whether the private sector has 
complied with obligations in relation to such conditions prior to handback. 
Compensation amount will differ depending on the cause of termination. Termination 
as a result of default by the institution is usually greater than that payable in the event 
of Force Majeure and substantially less for defaults caused by the private party. 
 
The compensation on termination for the public party default should take into account 
all outstanding amounts in respect of the debt (at fixed interest rate) including 
breakage costs as well as premiums, third parties to the projects (for example 
subcontractor), shareholder loans and return on equity that reflect market value. All 
compensation amounts should be stipulated and payable in Rands and result in no 
exposure to exchange rate or currency risks to the public party.  
 
Compensation on termination for private party default is effected under PPP for office 
accommodation agreements for reasons that the project asset revert to the public 
sector and failure to pay may unfairly benefit the public party without compensating 
the private party for the asset market value. 
 
The market value approach is intended to represents the balance between protecting 
the public party’s interests and unfair penalties on the private party while taking into 
account poor performance by the private party. It also encourages the Lenders to step-
in to rescue the project instead of simply relying on the termination payment to 
recover their debt. 
 
To address the lenders concerns in respect of the possibility of the market value being 
insufficient to cover the outstanding debt, compensation is based on a greater amount 
between payment of an agreed percentage of debt and the highest re-tendered value of 
the project. However the liquidity of the market in realizing a fair market value of the 
project in the current South African PPP environment remains a challenge. This is 
expected to improve as the South African PPP market matures. In the event that there 
is no liquidity in the market or the public party elects not to retender, the adjusted 
  
 32
estimated project value (unitary payment forecast from the date of termination to the 
expiry date) should be calculated. In this instance the compensation will be based on 
greater of the amounts between pre-agreed portion of debt and the adjusted estimated 
project value. 
 
Compensation on Termination for Force Majeure occurring through no fault of either 
party should be somewhere between the compensation payable on termination for 
public party default and that payable on private party default. Compensation on 
Termination for Corrupt Acts will be equal to the debt outstanding. The debt payment 
will be excluded if corruption is attributable to the Lender and similarly shareholders 
will not be compensated for the loss in equity and shareholder loans if they played a 
part in the corruption act. 
 
The PPP agreement must provide for the use of rights of licenses in respect of 
intellectual property made available by the private party during the public party step-
in period or following the termination as the costs of these use rights will be included 
in the unitary payment. Access to all such information and materials should be 
granted to a New Private Party to facilitate the smooth hand over to it of the facilities. 
 
The Role of Public Works Department in the PPP Process 
The Public Works Department (“PWD”) is the custodian of office accommodation 
requirements for National and Provincial government department as well as most 
state-owned properties. PWD has an important role to play in the initial needs analysis 
stage to establish the user client office accommodation requirements as well as 
availing the selected site for the purposes of the development if it is state-owned or 
controlled. However the PWD has come under much criticism for its lack of capacity 
to effectively deliver PPP projects on behalf of the user clients. The processes (such 
as in the Department of Education PPP project) are often not streamlined and 
integrated with the user clients’ and treasury to provide a unified direction to the 
private party or bidding entities. The PWD is poorly resourced to deal with the 
complexities of PPP processes. The process is marred by poor communication and 
dissemination of information to the bidding entities. This often leaves the user-client 
and the private party disgruntled about the process and abortive costs resulting from 
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unsuccessful tendering process. The PWD has served more as a conduit between the 
user-client and the private party without real benefits. 
 
The competing interests and the priory on infrastructure project places pressure on 
PWD to apply itself to the demands of PPP Agreement. It is thus recommended until 
such time that there is adequate capacity for the Department of Public Works, the 
User client should have the flexibility to appoint a champion independent of PWD to 
handle the PPP Agreement on its behalf. For a speedy and streamlined PPP process, 
the participation of PWD should be limited to the initial phases of the project of 
establishing the needs analysis, providing information and data necessary for 
conducting due diligence and surveys and assist in making the site available for the 
purposes of the development if the selected property is in its control.  
 
2.5 South African Environment for PPP Projects 
 
It is inherently difficult to use British precedents of PPP projects as the basis for 
evaluating South African PPP projects, as there are fundamental differences between 
them. These differences have a direct impact on pricing, risk transfer and the ability of 
many smaller private sector enterprises, particularly previously disadvantaged 
enterprises, from participating in the process. These differences are on micro- and 
macro-economic levels, as well as on the socio-economic level. . 
 
a) Macro Economic Factors 
 
 Currency Fluctuations 
The ability to underwrite the currency-risk over a long period, say 25 years, in 
an economy with a free-floating currency and with a significant import 
component for specialised equipment such as lifts and air-conditioning, is 
impaired. The South African insurance market for such long-term exposure is 
very small and premiums are often prohibitive. However, these insurance costs 
must be factored into the overall cost of a project during the construction and 
operational phase of the project. The UK is less affected by currency 
fluctuations and thus these insurance costs are significantly lower than in 
South Africa.  
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Inflation 
Inflation in South Africa has only been brought under control in the last four 
to five years and there is no guarantee that this will remain at this level in the 
distant future. CPIX is the recommended indexation mechanism for PPPs as is 
the case for the increases in governmental institutions’ budgetary allocations. 
Although the National Treasury Standardised PPP provisions recommends for 
the inflation risks to be shared by both parties, the allocation of such risks 
must be factored into the project costs and may put pressure on the Unitary 
Payment. The UK, on the other hand, has a generally low inflation economy 
and seems to have mastered the threat of rampant inflation. 
 
Interest Rate 
Fluctuations in interest rates have a major impact on the ability to service debt 
and on property related services provided over the concession period. Fixing 
the interest rate over the period of the concession has a major implication on 
the affordability threshold or unitary fee the public sector is willing to pay for 
the services it renders. It is often expected that these risks be borne by the 
private sector. Government is often reluctant to factor this security cost into 
the unitary payment.  
 
b) Micro Economic Factors 
  
The Capacity of the Market 
The South African building industry is well established and capable of 
handling large-scale projects. The financial resources are also at the industry’s 
disposal to invest in equity for PPP projects.  
 
The South African lending institutions have adequate resources and an 
appetite for PPP projects. The expertise has been developed for very complex 
and sophisticated financial models for both senior and sub-ordinate debt. The 
main area of challenge remains the facilities management aspect of a project. 
The UK market has a depth of resources in the facilities management arena, 
and its access to continental European enterprises makes for a mature and 
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competitive market. Facilities management capability in South Africa has not 
yet matured and the existing facilities management companies often do not 
have the financial strength (balance sheet) required to invest equity in the 
concession company or the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). They have 
difficulty in comfortably underwriting the risks related to the long-term 
operational requirements for the facility i.e. the life cycle costs and the 
performance of the subcontracted companies that provide them with services. 
It is thus difficult in the current market to predict prices, markets and 
availability of large capital expenditure items over 25-years.  
 
The vast experience in the UK results in a sense of comfort through 
precedence, for those participating in the PPP. In South Africa, as stated 
above, the entire process is new with limited capacity to handle and commit it 
to a long-term contract with obligations to guarantee performance, not only of 
the main contractors, but also of the small market of good-quality sub-
contractors. Until South Africans find the same level of comfort experienced 
in the UK, they will demonstrate a degree of cautiousness.  
 
c) Socio Economic  
 Empowerment 
There is fundamental need in South Africa to redress the inequalities of the past 
through black economic empowerment (BEE). However, the cost of capital for 
empowerment funding often presents financial inefficiencies, as the expected 
returns on the BEE equity investment are significantly higher than those of 
traditional funding because of perceived risks in relation to empowerment 
participants. This naturally puts a burden on the overall project cost. 
This may not necessary be the case in the UK. Where it has occurred, the 
requirement has not been as vigorous as in South Africa.  
 
Bearing these factors in mind, the concessionaire, with specific reference to the PPP 
Agreement, has to be intent on reaching a point where the broad principles of PPPs 
are met, while still taking cognisance of the unique South African business 
environment.  
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As is clear from the above discussion, the UK approach needs to be seriously adapted 
to fit the South African context. The Concessionaires have to place collars or limits on 
those items that are beyond their control and beyond the parameters of what is 
regarded as normal business risk whilst the public sector must achieve optimum risk 
transfer. 
 
The Concessionaire, in taking an unprecedented 25-year view on developments in the 
South African market, is compelled not only to assess long-term micro economic 
factors, but also the long-term macro economic conditions and factors. Based on the 
findings, the concessionaire must price on the information gained and assume certain 
risks, bearing in mind the long-term best interest of the parties for the project. Added 
to this, the empowerment parties, with their limited resources, must closely evaluate 
the financial burden and exposure to a single major investment and the impact that 
this places on their businesses.  
 
The prudent approach to be adopted by the concessionaire in light of the Standardised 
provisions of PPP Agreements is to price for standard business risk, but not assume 
the risk resulting from events beyond their ambit of control. 
 
For the successful transfer of risk, a degree of economic stability is required. PPP 
projects are unlikely to succeed in an environment of hyperinflation and currency 
devaluation. A concessionaire should be compelled to accept the normal peaks and 
troughs every economy experiences. Beyond these accepted norms, it would be a 
deterrent for parties to embrace the PPP process. The risk-reward profile must be 
carefully balanced. 
 
The above factors will largely influence the extent to which a concessionaire is 
willing to take the risks against the reward associated with the activities to be 
performed. 
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 2.6 Value for Money Drivers  
 
The review discusses the key value drivers and outlines some of the criticisms against 
PPPs. The relevant key value drivers for office accommodation PPP have been 
identified as follows:   
 
• Robust and innovative financial solution 
• Performance measurement and incentives  
• Risk transfer 
• Long term nature of the contract 
• The use of output-based specification 
• Procurement allowing for competition 
• Partnership approach 
• Private sector management skills 
 
These value drivers are based on a study undertaken by Arthur and Enterprise LSE in 
2001 commissioned by the Treasury Task force to examine the VFM aspects of 
operational PFI projects. Its conclusions were broadly supportive of PPP and PFI as 
procurement mechanisms. 
 
The study used four approaches: a literature review and a survey of NAO reports into 
PFI projects; a survey of public sector project managers’ opinions; scrutiny of 
Forward Business Cases (FBCs) and recommendations on the areas project managers 
should focus on to obtain value for money in PFI projects. 
 
The key findings were as follows:  
a) From a public sector perspective, there are six key drivers of value for money 
in PFI projects as stated above; 
b) The gap between the cost of private sector capital and public sector borrowing 
has been narrowing as PFI matures and the public and private sectors gain 
experience, and is not as high as some of the literature suggests; 
c) The estimated average percentage saving against the Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) for the sample projects was 17 percent. According to the 
public sector's own figures, the PFI appears to offer excellent value for money; 
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d) The ongoing use of PSCs will require a periodic review to ensure their 
continuing relevance and application as a benchmark; 
e) The success of PFI as a procurement method is becoming well-established and 
a robust procurement framework has been established 
 
Pollock and Vickers have questioned the findings of the report, in particular the 
conclusion that PFI is 17 percent cheaper than the PSC. They suggest that the results 
are skewed as more than 50 percent of the savings came from one project out of a 
total of 29 evaluated. They claim that if this is taken into account and normalised, the 
saving would only amount to an average of 6 percent. 
  
Although this study has been criticised, it does unearth the relevant VFM aspects of 
PPP and PFI. The research is, in the main, based on this study but focused primarily 
on the key VFM drivers identified by the Anderson report and applies this to the 
South African context through a survey of the private sector and public sector PPP 
participants’ opinion on the relevance of these key drivers in an office 
accommodation PPP project. 
 
The Government of Victoria partnership (2001b, p.4) asserts that the best value for 
money to government is achieved by focusing on the output specifications, the public 
interest, the capabilities of both government and private sector, the optimal risk 
allocation environment and commercial viability. The object is to achieve effective 
and efficient value for money outputs. 
 
2.7 Does the use of PPP Provide Cost of Capital Advantage? 
The use cost of capital as a discount rate or measure of evaluating investment decision 
is argued based on the following advantages: 
 
a) lower borrowing cost 
b) lower investment costs in terms of staff resources employed 
c)  an exception from direct and indirect taxation and some statutory charges such 
as stamp duty 
d)  exemption from compliance with business regulations and market driven 
pricing policies taking into account, production costs and return on investment
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It is argued (Braely, Cooper and Habib 1997; Rochester 1999) that the cost of capital 
differences between private and public sector have no bearing on the investment 
decision. 
 
Research studies (Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 1999) suggest that cost-savings are 
achieved when public services are contracted out to the private sector and that the 
benefit of private sector management skill in a project impacts on value for money. 
The cost of capital is one out of many components that impacts on value for money, 
and thus cannot be viewed in isolation to other components such as innovation and 
technology, risk transfer, efficient management, whole-of-life cycle costs of assets. 
The cost of capital argument is largely irrelevant to the PPP debate (Regan 2005). The 
cost of capital in both public and private provision of services is an input to costing 
provision but not the only determinant on value for money.  
 
The analysis to follow will focus on the significance of other value drivers on the 
effectiveness of PPP for delivery of office accommodation projects. 
 
2.8 Do PPPs Provide Robust and Innovative Financial Solution Using Project 
Financing? 
 
Proponents of PPPs argue that PPPs provide for better use of public finance through 
their use of project finance. The financing structure for PPP allows accelerated 
delivery of public infrastructure projects. By opting for a PPP long–term “leasing” 
solution rather than outright purchase of capital assets, the public budget can be 
utilised more effectively and more projects can be brought into use more quickly. The 
PPPs are effective for the delivery of services as they use project financing or non-
recourse financing and therefore leave the balance sheet unencumbered for other 
capital expenditures.  
 
The project financing is characterised by the formation of highly-geared special 
purpose company for the project vehicle and consequently a reliance on direct 
revenues to pay for operating costs and cover debt financing while giving the desired 
return on risk capital (Grimsy and Lewis 2002). It is non-recourse or limited recourse 
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financing predicted on the financial and technical merits of a project rather than on the 
credit of the project sponsor. The credit appraisal of the lender is therefore based on 
underlying cash flow from revenue-producing contracts of the project (Jones, 2001). 
Therefore the success of PPP project financing comes down to cash flow. In terms of 
structuring levels of debt, and equity in projects, a common philosophy is to utilise as 
much debt as the project cash-flows permit, so as to realise an attractive return for the 
shareholders as often equity funding is far more expensive than debt finance. 
 
However, the risks associated with the use of project financing demonstrate that a 
mere reliance on contract is often insufficient to protect the lender from the risks. 
Credit support from a creditworthy source is often necessary. Credit support can take 
a form of direct guarantees by the project sponsor or project participants, guarantees 
by third parties not directly participating in the project, or in the form of contingent 
guarantees. Commercial risks must generally be covered by credit support of the 
project sponsor or by a responsible third party.  
 
The argument against the use of project financing for office accommodation is that 
there are cheaper sources of funding that can be applied, given the security that 
property offers as an asset. Furthermore, there are far cheaper financial models that do 
not necessarily put pressure on the sponsors for additional guarantees, which are 
typically required in the funding of PPP transaction by the lenders as well as the client 
body to cover the risk associated with project financing. 
 
Lenders and host government (client) want to see the sponsors put equity into their 
projects. Government looks at equity investment as providing a level of commitment 
into the project by the project company, whilst lenders look at equity as providing a 
margin of safety. The two primary motivations for requiring equity investment in 
projects which lenders finance include: 
• Lenders expect the projected cash flows generated by the project to be 
sufficient to pay operating expenses, service debt and provide very 
comfortable margin of safety to meet any contingencies that might arise. The 
more burden the debt service puts on the cash flows the greater the lender’s 
risk. 
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• Lenders do not want sponsors to be in a position to walk away easily from the 
project. They want the sponsors to have enough at stake to motivate them to 
see the project through to successful conclusion. 
 
Van Schalkwyk (1984) indicates that one of the ways of enhancing the return to 
shareholders is to use mezzanine finance in PPP projects, particularly for emerging or 
empowerment entities that may not have upfront equity to invest in a large project. 
The choice of a particular type of financial instrument depends on several factors 
including: 
 
• The project’s prospective cash-flows 
• The cost of the instrument 
• The legal and tax consequences of using the instrument 
• The capital structure of the project company, existing and prospective 
• The risk /reward perceptions of the financial institutions involved 
• The size and purpose of the financing. 
 
The attraction of providing mezzanine finance for the lending institutions stems from 
higher yield (approximately 4 percent above cost of senior debt), which can be 
obtained from this type of finance, particularly in the light of eroding margins on 
traditional lending. The returns expected on mezzanine finance vary and depend on 
the perceived level of risk of the project. Higher risk instrument examples are those 
used to finance emerging or empowerment entities resembling equity commands a 
considerably higher return on capital (approximately 20 percent or more on an 
internal rate of return basis).  
 
It is often difficult to predict life-cycle costing for office accommodation in South 
Africa with any fair degree of accuracy, so as to ensure that the cash flows generated 
by the project are indeed sufficient to service the long term debt, given the relatively 
weak market for subcontractors who would be willing and capable of providing the 
necessary guarantees on the performance of the input specification of the building 
over the concession period (minimum of 25years). 
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A criticism of the PPP model is that the principal reason for governments 
entering into PPPs is to avoid debt. (Centre for Public Services, 2001) 
  
A criticism of PPPs is that they are a device to move public capital borrowings off 
balance sheet through complex financing structures that limit transparency. The 
principal reasons for government becoming involved in PPPs for office 
accommodation are to benefit from increased efficiency, shorter implementation time, 
greater innovation and ultimately better value in the delivery of services brought 
about by increased competition. The ability to finance a project so that the debt is "off 
book" should not be the prime motivation for entering into a PPP. The government 
and the ultimate users of the service are still responsible for servicing the debt in one 
way or another. The emphasis should be on structuring creative and cost-effective 
ways of delivering services, not creative accounting. 
 
The House of Commons Committee report asserts that the government should account 
for the current and capital liabilities of a PFI project separately and ensure that value 
for money is recognized as the main justification for PFI. 
 
Some of the controversy around PPP is that the cost of service will increase to 
pay for the private partner's profit  
 
The argument here is that government departments sometimes resists PPPs because 
they believe that the cost of providing the service will increase to reflect the profits 
the private partner must realise to stay in business.  The alternate view is that while 
the private partner will need to make a profit, the profit must be earned within the 
existing or a lower price for the service. Presumably, the government would only 
enter into a PPP if the price of providing a given service was lower than if the 
government department provided it, or if a higher level of service could be provided 
for the same price by the private partner (This assumes that the government is not 
subsidising the cost of providing the service.) The PSC includes the calculation of the 
cost of traditional procurement, which effectively neutralises any difference between 
public and private sectors (Fitzgerald 2004, pp22-31). The private partner's profit can 
only be realised through increased productivity or expansion of service, not through 
higher prices 
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The UK’s National Audit Office investigated the actual performance of a wide range 
of PFI projects and concluded that, on average, there were typically savings of 
between 10 and 20 percent over the normal public procurement process. 
 
The perception that exists is that Government can finance the cost of services at 
a lower cost than the private sector. 
 
By borrowing through the National Treasury or the Municipal Finance Authority, 
government can often finance projects at a lower cost than the private sector can. 
However, this may not always be the case. The objective of government should be to 
focus on the overall advantages of the PPP arrangement and its core competence 
areas. 
 
A UK-based study carried out by Arthur Anderson into the value for money drivers in 
the PFI response to the argument is that the gap between the public sector’s borrowing 
rate (the yield on gilts) and the private sector’s weighted average cost of capital has 
been narrowing as the PPP sector matures and the public and private sectors gain in 
experience. It is expected that this will also be the case for office accommodation 
projects in the South African context.  
 
Some of the arguments advanced suggesting that public borrowing is cheaper than 
private sector finance do not take into account the value of transfer of risks and 
pricing of such risks in PPP transactions. The general public would most likely bear 
the risk of increased future tax payments if the risks carried by government under 
conventional procurement contract were to materialise, an example being cost 
overruns.  
 
However, this argument does not take into account the use of the PSC, which includes 
the calculation of the traditional procurement, which effectively neutralises any 
difference between the public and private sectors provision. Therefore, what accounts 
for value for money is the differential between the public and private sector risk 
pricing. For the value for money to be realised, the PPP contract must provide for the 
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performance or compliance with the output specification to be underwritten by the 
private sector. 
 
The ability to achieve value for money does not only depend upon the private sector 
being able to deliver great cost savings in relation to the finance costs, but more on 
the risk weighted costs between public and private sector provision of service. The 
business cases examined by Arthur Anderson in their report suggest that the costs 
savings are deliverable. 
 
 The valuation of long-term projects requires the forecasting of net cash flows and the 
NPV using a discount rate equal to a risk free rate, with a premium commensurate 
with the risk profile of a project (EPAC 1995a, pp.167-9). The different approaches to 
application of discount rates are, and will continue to be, an irreconcilable difference 
between public and private sectors (Grout, 2003).Therefore, the question of capital 
costs benefit is less relevant than whether the risk weighted cost by private provision 
is lower than the cost of public or in-house provision. 
 
2.9 Socio Economic Benefits 
 
Increased involvement of government in PPPs can help to stimulate the private sector 
and contribute to increased employment and economic growth. With PPPs, 
governments can do a lot more with their capital expenditure budgets in delivering 
social services.  
 
Sussex (2001) challenges the argument that a PFI allows for more investment than 
conventional funding. In his view, government decision, not funding process, is the 
main determinant of investment activity.  
   
Hall (1998) argues that for PPPs to be effective for delivery of public infrastructure, 
the project should realise additional investment in social infrastructure. The activity 
created by construction and other related services has positive multiplier effects and a 
direct and indirect bearing on the economy.  
 
The literature research points to a positive correlation in three sets of relationships  
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1) between infrastructure investments, technology, productivity and growth,  
2) between capital deepening, capital productivity, infrastructure investment and 
leading indicators of microeconomic performance, and  
3) investment in infrastructure makes positive contribution to macroeconomic 
performance and is enhanced by favourable institutional frameworks and public 
policy settings. 
 
PPPs are also geared to producing benefits for black economic empowerment, 
community and other social interest groups.  
 
Another criticisms is that Government staff will lose under PPPs  
 
Both union and non-union staff sometimes fear PPPs because of potential job loss or 
reduced wages and salaries. Any public private partnership agreement will need to 
reflect the relevant labour laws and existing collective agreements. Often, the labour 
representatives are invited at an early stage of the process to discuss options for 
service delivery. Most partnership agreements that have been negotiated require the 
private partner to take on public staff and guarantee job security and salary levels. 
Any changes in staffing levels are generally consistent with labour contracts and 
occur through attrition rather than layoffs. Many of the benefits of PPPs, such as 
increased efficiency and higher quality of service, have been accomplished through 
former employees of government. Reasons for increased productivity include 
increased investment in employees through training, technology transfer and skill 
diversification. 
 
The argument in relation to the negative effect of PPPs on public sector staff can be 
addressed by taking steps to address staff concerns through issuing guidance on 
disclosure of information and consultation with staff. It is necessary to have clear 
treasury guidance on dealing with staff pensions when staff is transferred to the 
private sector.   
 
Although collective agreements and labour laws apply to PPP arrangements, there 
could still be adverse reactions from labour unions or government staff. To overt 
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some of the negative effects on staff, the support of staff and trade unions needs to be 
canvassed and obtained to successfully implement the PPPs procurement process. 
 
The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 1999 and 2000 states that there 
should be no negative effects for staff transferred as part of a PFI contract. Research 
on staffing trends within the PFI contract should be undertaken to guard against the 
development of two-tier employment status as between the employees from the public 
sector and private sector. The most productive partnerships are those in which 
government employees, and sometimes their unions, are actively involved in the 
partnership planning process. 
 
2.10 Risk Transfer  
Risk, according to Kerzner (1995) is a measure of the probability and consequence of 
not achieving a defined project goal and, according to Grey (1995) 'the issues which 
might hinder a project from being a success.  
It is argued that risk transfer is a major benefit of a PPP (Hodge 2004, p.39f). The 
Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE report also confirms that risk transfer is a major 
value driver of PPP projects but not necessarily the only one. The survey for this 
research has shed some light on the degree of importance of this driver in relation to 
other value drivers as far as delivery of office accommodation is concerned. 
 
With PPPs, government can share the risks with a private partner. Risks could include 
cost overruns, inability to meet schedules for service delivery, difficulty in complying 
with environmental and other regulations, or the risk that revenues may not be 
sufficient to pay operating and capital costs. 
 
The Private Finance Panel, 1995 government publication identifies seven principal 
PFI types of risk arising from designing, building, financing and operating an asset, 
which should be transferred where necessary to the party best able to manage the risk 
to ensure best value for money. Treasury guidelines outline the indicators which show 
whether or not the operator (private sector) is bearing real commercial risks as 
follows: 
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• Design and construction risks 
• Availability of services and performance risk 
• Residual value of asset risk 
• Changes in technology/Obsolescence risk 
• Financing 
• Changes in legislation/ regulations 
• Demand (volume/usage) risk 
 
The key risk inherent in the PPP project, from the perspective of the main 
parties to the project. (International Journal of Project Management, Vol.2 Issue 
2, Feb 2002, pg. 107 –118) 
 
The providers of finance identify at least nine risks associated with PPP projects:  
• Technical risks, due to engineering and design failures 
• Construction risk, because of faulty construction techniques and cost 
escalation and delays in construction 
• Operating risks, due to higher operating and maintenance costs 
• Revenue risks, due to non –performance 
• Financial risks arising from inadequate hedging of revenues streams and 
financing costs 
• Force majeure risk involving unforeseen and uncontrollable events (e.g. war 
and other calamities ) 
• Regulatory or political risks, due to legal changes and unsupportive 
government policies 
• Environmental risks, because of adverse environmental impacts and hazards 
• Project default, due to failure of the project from a combination of the above ( 
 
 The Sponsor (Equity investor's) Perspective:  
• Volume risks 
• The risk of mid-life capital expenditure and asset management costs being 
greater than the forecast 
• Operating costs 
• Operating performance 
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Much of the risks of a PPP project come from the complexity of the arrangement 
itself in terms of documentation, financing, taxation, technical details, sub-agreements 
etc. involved in a major infrastructure venture. The nature of the risks alters over the 
duration of the project, for example, the construction phase will give rise to different 
risks from those during the operating phase.  The issue of risk transfer is often a 
source of great debate and at the centre of negotiations between the public and private 
sector. The question often raised is whether the transfer of some of the risks to private 
sector results in value for money. The private sector would price-in the risks that it 
assumes into the financial structure of the project and this would affect the unitary fee 
payable by the public sector. The key issue is to achieve optimal risk allocation 
resulting in value for money. 
 
PPPs improve value for money by allocating risks to those that are best able to 
manage them in the public and private sectors. No standard risk transfer template 
applies to all projects, as they are all different and specific (Regan, 2005). However, 
there are guidelines that can be used to ensure that value for money is achieved:   
 
• The risk allocation model must ensure that the risks are allocated to the party 
best able to manage them; 
• The market must have sufficient management quality to absorb and control the 
transferred risks; 
• Genuine risk transfer and reliable risk allocation even under extreme 
circumstances; and 
• The extent to which residual value risk is transferred to the private sector 
 
The risks are allocated to either the private or public sector depending on the type and 
ability of the party to control and manage them. Turner & Townsend (2002), in their 
review of risk assessment techniques for PPPs, suggest that a preliminary allocation 
of risk should be used as a guide for evaluating the bids. This should be further 
developed during the negotiation process, with final allocation only taking place at the 
end of the negotiation process. 
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This approach provides a framework of risk allocation and flexibility to accommodate 
the private sector assessment of risk. If properly used, it can reduce the lengthy 
negotiation period associated with PPP processes.  
 
The view that PPPs are more costly because of the effective risk transfer to the private 
sector stems from the argument that the private sector needs to charge a premium for 
the risk it absorbs and that this is reflected in the price paid by government (Hodge 
2004, p.39)  
 
A recent study of the success of PPP projects, Public/Private Partnership: a clearer 
view, published by PricewaterhouseCoopers, suggests that risk transfer should be fair 
and offer the private sector incentives to perform. This may be achieved by 
developing an optimum risk transfer profile, where specific issues on each project are 
taken into account and risk is allocated on the basis of the party best able to manage 
the risk thus offering  both the public and private sector parties value for money. 
Megens (1997) argues that the risk profile of a PPP arrangement is not static and 
changes over time. The risks decline as the contract progresses and the project 
stabilises.   
 
Key Variables in Risk Allocation  
 
The National Audit Office (1999) asserts that in allocating risks and negotiating 
contracts, the relationship between price and risk is affected by the nature of the 
market and the approach adapted by individual companies. Several bids should be 
compared and systematically analysed to obtain the best possible understanding of the 
assumptions that are critical for the affordability of the individual schemes. 
 
The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee in 1999 and 2000 recommended 
that risk transfer should be clearly identified to ensure that the private sector does not 
seek to minimise operational risk by reducing service specification once the contract 
is started. 
 
The Public Sector Comparator must contain a clear statement of the risks that have 
been identified, quantified and included in it. Upfront disclosure of standard risk 
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transfer and allocation between public and private sector can go a long way towards 
reducing the long negotiation period associated with PPPs.  
 
 Value for money and risk allocation model in construction PPP projects is intended to 
help the public and private sectors reduce time spent in allocating and negotiating 
risks and thus help in achieving optimal VFM in PPP projects. The risk allocation 
model suggests that macro level risks should be retained by the public sector, meso-
economic risks should be transferred to the private sector, while micro-level risks 
should be shared between the two sectors. Li, Akintoye ,Hardcastle, 2002. 
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TABLE 2:  Risk Allocation in PPP Projects 
 
 Public Private Shared Preferred Risk 
Allocation 
Nationalisation/expropriation 79.4% 8.8% 11.8% Public Sector 
Poor political decision-making 
process 
69.0% 6.9% 24.1%  
Political opposition 62.5% 21.9 15.6%  
Site availability 60.6% 12.1% 27.3%  
Government stability 58.3% 25.0% 16.7%  
Level of public support 45.8% 41.7% 12.5% Strongly 
Depending 
Project approval and permit 35.1% 32.4% 32.4%  
Contract variation 33.3% 25.6% 41.0%  
Lack of experiences in PPP 
arrangement 
13.3% 43.3% 43.3%  
Lack of commitment from 
public/private partner 
24.1% 10.3% 65.5% Shared 
Force majeure 18.4% 13.2% 68.4%  
Legislation change 17.1% 22.0% 61.0%  
Responsibilities and risk distribution 0.0% 22.6% 77.4%  
Authority distribution between 
partnerships 
4.0% 28.0% 68.0%  
Tax regulation change 17.9% 51.3% 30.8% Primarily to 
Private Sector 
Late design changes 26.3% 52.6% 21.1%  
Residual risk 22.6% 54.8% 22.6%  
Inflation 7.3% 56.1% 36.6%  
Tradition of private provision of 
public service 
27.3% 59.1% 13.6%  
Staff crisis 6.7% 60.0% 33.3%  
Third party tort liability 3.3% 60.0% 36.7%  
Influential economic events 8.3% 69.4% 22.2%  
Financial attraction of project 3.0% 69.7% 27.3%  
Level of demanding project 7.7% 73.1% 19.2%  
Different working methods 0.0% 73.3% 26.7%  
Industrial regulatory change 0.0% 75.0% 25.0% Solely to Private 
Sector 
High financing cost 3.0% 75.8% 21.2%  
Interest rate 2.4% 78.0% 19.5%  
Organisation and co-ordination risk 0.0% 80.6% 19.4%  
Weather 0.0% 82.1% 17.9%  
Environment 0.0% 84.2% 15.8%  
Availability of finance 0.0% 85.3% 14.7%  
Ground condition 5.1% 87.2% 7.7%  
Operational revenue below par 2.7% 89.2% 8.1%  
Financial market 0.0% 89.5% 10.5%  
Quality of workmanship 2.5% 92.5% 5.0%  
Construction cost overrun 0.0% 92.5% 7.5%  
Frequency of maintenance 0.0% 92.5% 7.5%  
Availability of labour/material 0.0% 94.4% 5.6%  
Insolvency of subcontractors/suppliers 0.0% 94.7% 5.3%  
Low operating productivity 0.0% 94.9% 5.1%  
Design deficiency 0.0% 95.0% 5.0%  
Unproven engineering techniques 0.0% 97.0% 3.0%  
Operation cost overrun 0.0% 97.5% 2.5%  
Higher maintenance cost 0.0% 97.5% 2.5%  
Construction time delay 0.0% 97.6% 2.4%  
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The above model can serve as a guideline for allocation of risk for PPP office 
accommodation projects in South Africa. 
 
2.11 Performance Measurement 
 
The study carried out by the UK Department of Finance into performance indicators, 
suggests that good indicators are characterised by: 
 
• Appropriateness – the user should be able to relate the information 
• The activity, output or outcome required. 
• Accuracy- the data must, as much as possible, be free of error and the level of 
confidence must be clarified or degree of error specified. 
• Comprehensiveness – all aspects of performance must be captured including 
quantitative as well as qualitative. 
• Consistency - the indicators must deliver a clear message and reliable for future 
use in comparing performance over time. 
• Relevance – the indicators must provide the information required 
• Timely – must use the most recent data available  
• Verifiable – the indicators must have a high level of accuracy, objectivity and lack 
of bias.  
• Validity –the indicators must cover actual performance, focusing on the specified 
outcome. 
 
The Audit Commission report highlights the importance of performance management 
in PFI projects. The report is keen to ensure that PFIs are not rejected because long-
term contracts are incompatible with the principles of best value. However, it must be 
noted that PFI contracts remain competitive through the regular market testing of 
services by applying the relevant industry benchmarks. 
 
Reduced quality or efficiency of service  
 
If not properly structured, PPP contracts can result in a reduction in service quality, 
inefficient service delivery or a lack of proper facility maintenance. For example, 
cost-plus contracts provide little incentive for the private partner to maintain quality 
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or increase efficiency. Government (user client) should also consider the life-cycle 
cost approach in establishing evaluation criteria for projects or services. 
 
The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee in 1999 and 2000 recommended 
that once the PFI projects have been implemented, a monitoring system must be put in 
place to continually ensure that value for money is achieved and to identify innovative 
approaches that could be transferred to publicly funded projects. 
 
It is suggested that a central system of collecting information on each PFI project be 
established to enable comparative analyses. In particular, it should be clear which 
types of projects are most suitable for PFI e.g. size, expected life of the asset, type of 
risk. 
  
2.12 Procurement Process 
 
A study undertaken by DEPFA Bank plc, PPP Report Global PPP, 2002, based on 
the British experiences, shows that PPPs provide better value for money because of 
the competitive procurement process and the ability to benefit from whole-life costing 
as opposed to traditional public procurement process).  The PPP model enables a 
better overall economic solution coupled with lower annual operating and 
maintenance costs over the long-term, and a resultant affordability. 
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) report (1997) that examines the value for money of 
deals under PPPs in the UK indictaes that procurement process is a key element in 
delivering value for money. It attaches significant value to maintaining competition as 
late as possible in the award process and further recognises the costs related to this 
benefit as essential for achieving value for money. 
  
The major criticism around the PPP procurement process is that the public sector 
often puts out PPP projects to the market without undertaking a comprehensive 
analysis of the key factors for successful PPP procurement.  
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The NAO report sets out a systematic way for the public sector to assess projects for 
value for money.  The report focuses on four main aspects necessary for a successful 
project: 
 
• Setting Clear Objectives  
Determining in advance what is expected to be achieved in a project and how the 
outcomes are to be achieved. Also choosing high priority projects based on a needs 
analysis and determining the best partnership approach based on a well-defined 
business case. 
 
• Applying a proper procurement process 
Relevant laws and regulations must be complied with and aimed at achieving a deal 
that is good value for money. 
 
• Selecting the best deal available 
The procurement process must deliver the best deal available in the market. A good 
range of solutions must be assessed, all elements of the bid must be evaluated with the 
aim of selecting the most economically viable and advantageous bid. 
 
• Ensuring that the deal is competitive  
In the final stages of the deal, more reliance is placed on negotiation with the 
preferred bidder to achieve best value for money. A requirement for an experienced 
team becomes more critical at this stage  
 
Inability to benefit from competition  
 
The competition amongst private partners to secure the right to enter into a PPP is an 
important benefit for government. Competition leads to innovation, efficiency and 
lower costs. Government might not be able to benefit from PPPs if there are only a 
limited number of potential private partners with the expertise or ability to respond to 
a request for proposals. 
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Pollock (2001) in the review of the Institute of Public Policy Research challenge the 
view that competitive pressures between project bidders will ensure value for money. 
The review argues that the small number of bidders leaves the private sector in a 
potentially powerful position. 
 
Lessons learned from Skye Bridge projects in Scotland whereby the overall costs of 
£15million were higher than planned. The NAO report found that although the 
Scottish Office was not able to bring competition to bear in the last stages of the deal, 
reliance was placed on negotiation with the preferred bidder to determine some 
important financing costs. 
 
The industry concern is that bid costs remain too high and therefore making 
access difficult for small firms.  
 
Factors such as relatively high cost of failure, typically large projects, lack of 
appropriate skills, lack of credibility in the market place and lack of resources needed 
to provide long term PPP contract remain a constraint for fair competition. 
 
The general comments have indicated that more could be done to minimize the 
lengthy contract award period and reduce the costs by standardizing the concession 
agreement as well as improving the efficiency of public sector by the client having 
more control of the process, conducting a proper due diligence and clearly identifying 
the value drivers through a consultative process with the industry earlier in the 
process. A better understanding of the PPP process and capacity by the public sector 
is required to achieve effective delivery of office accommodation projects.  
 
The industry recons that because of the complexity of the process, a lot of senior 
management time is spent on the transaction resulting in huge opportunity costs for 
private sector. This may improve with more deal flow and as the market for PPP 
matures in South Africa.  
 
Does the PPP Procurement Process Result in Increased Costs?  
 
Not all user clients (government departments) consider the true costs of providing 
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services when establishing their pricing policies for fees for services. For example, the 
costs of overhead or administration and depreciation of assets are often not included 
in the pricing of individual services. In some cases, there are explicit subsidies for 
specific services. The delivery of services through PPPs requires pricing policies and 
fees to reflect all relevant costs. This can have the effect of increasing user fees for 
specific services. 
 
The cost of managing public controversy over increased fees or developing complex 
policies for staging fee increases can often negate the value of PPPs for specific 
services. 
 
Recommendations made by the NAO report for departments responsible for PFI 
provides guidelines for avoiding some of the potential cost increases as follows: 
 
• Appointing advisors by competition, and set cost targets for advisors fees at the 
earliest opportunity 
• Carry out and document a comprehensive risk analysis for each private finance 
project 
• Check the financial robustness of bids 
• Where bids are conditional upon raising finance, seek independent confirmation 
that the financing on the proposed terms is likely to be achieved 
• Ensure that competition is brought to bear on the bidders in respect of all project 
costs including finance costs 
• Where there is no public sector comparator, a systematic financial comparison 
should be undertaken using realistic alternative options. 
 
Tiong (1996) highlights the keys to successful PPPs. While there is not a set formula 
or an absolute foolproof technique in crafting a successful PPP, each of these factors 
is involved in varying degrees. 
Political Leadership: 
A successful partnership can result only if there is commitment from "the top". The 
most senior public officials must be willing to be actively involved in supporting the 
concept of PPPs and taking a leadership role in the development of each given 
